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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a comparative political economy theoretical framework of high-skilled 
immigration (HSI thereafter) policies in advanced industrial countries and seeks to explain 
differences  in  countries’  policies  in  terms  of  HSI  openness.  I  take  from  the  traditional 
partisanship approach that political parties will pursue policies consistent with the preferences 
of their major constituencies. However, I divide labour and capital into high- and low-skilled 
sectors. I argue that, despite converging policy goals for more open HSI in order to fill labour 
market shortages, divergence between countries’ HSI policies continues. No consistent HSI 
position of left and right parties exists cross-nationally because different coalitions between 
sectors of high-skilled labour, low-skilled labour and capital take place. I analyze more open 
or restrictive HSI outcomes by portraying actors’ preferences that are aggregated in coalitions 
and  intermediated  by  institutional  constraints  (such  as  labour  market  organization  and 
electoral system) across advanced industrial countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Attracting  the  ‘best  and  brightest’  immigrants  has  become  government’s  priority  across 
advanced  industrial  (OECD)
1  countries  over  the  past  years.  Especially  labour  market 
shortages,  but  also  ageing  population,  decrease  in  human  capital  stock  and  international 
competition for innovation, progress and economic growth all heighten the conception that 
governments “need to act. Removing barriers is a priority: even America still rations the 
number of highly skilled immigrants it lets in, and Japan and many European countries do far 
worse” (The Economist, 5 October 2006). Yet, countries differ in their policies towards high-
skilled  immigration  (HSI  thereafter)
2.  High-  skilled  immigrants  are  usually  defined  as 
“possessing a tertiary level education or its equivalent in experience” (Salt 1997:5)
3. For 
example, both Germany and the United Kingdom were hit by labour market shortages to the 
same extent, but their HSI policy responses have varied. Why do countries differ in their 
openness towards HSI?  
 
Divergence between advanced industrial countries’ HSI policies continues, even if national 
governments display converging policy goals for more open HSI in order to fill labour market 
shortages at the high-skilled end. The shift toward greater HSI liberalization is visible in most 
countries, but it is not going on to the same extent or at the same rate. No consistent HSI 
position of left and right parties exists cross-nationally because different coalitions between 
groups of high-skilled labour, low-skilled labour and capital take place. I argue that coalition-
building  between  actors  with  varying  HSI  preferences,  mediated  by  labour  market 
organization  and  the  electoral  system,  determines  cross-national  variations  in  HSI  policy 
outcomes.  
 
The  paper  challenges  the  notion  that  there  is  increasing  convergence  among  countries’ 
policies. Yet, it also proposes a different account from the Varieties of Capitalism literature. 
Existing literature, which highlights structural economic factors and partisanship, does not 
sufficiently elucidate HSI policy differences. Therefore, I offer a new explanation for the 
continued HSI policy divergence by focusing on coalitions and national political-economy 
institutions.  Analyzing  HSI  from  a  coalitional  perspective  allows  exploring  different 
important issues in the political economy literature, such as the representation of different 
sectors of labour and capital, the tensions between affected actors with varying interests, the 
challenge  for  parties  in  government  to  respond  to  changing  HSI  preferences  and  the 
institutional constraints on HSI policies. 
 
2. Political- Economy Framework of HSI Policy 
 
This theoretical framework draws on a wide array of literature and combines approaches from 
political economy, coalitions, political parties and Varieties of Capitalism. It integrates the 
politics  of  migration  policy  into  the  broader  literature  of  comparative  politics.  Political 
science is rather a latecomer to the analysis of immigration, and in particular the area of HSI 
has been neglected so far. Nonetheless, political economy provides a fruitful approach for the 
rather  “atheoretical”  area  of  immigration  (Freeman  2002:82).  From  a  methodological 
perspective, Lindsay Lowell (2005) has offered a welcomed quantitative analysis of twelve 
countries in terms of HSI openness in temporary and permanent policies. However, this index 
solely ranks the most recent policy, but it would be more useful to consider changes in HSI 
policies over time.  
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2.1 Convergence/ divergence 
I contribute to the convergence/ divergence debate and argue that, despite converging policy 
goals for greater HSI liberalization, divergence in policy outcomes continues. I set myself 
apart from the sociological and economic convergence literature, as well as the VoC literature, 
which  focuses  only  on  economic  determinants.  One  strand  of  the  literature  argues  that 
countries are converging in many aspects due to best practice and efficiency arguments (i.e. it 
makes economically sense if systems become similar) (Cerny 1996, Crouch & Streeck 1997). 
The sociological proponents of convergence claim instead that countries are converging due 
to  the  spread  of  global  culture  and  the  adoption  of  similar  norms  (Featherstone  1990, 
Robertson  1992).  Globalization  and  technological  revolution  are  transforming  practices 
around the world and leading to a common model, more or less the Anglo-Saxon one.  
 
In the migration literature, the convergence hypothesis (Cornelius, Martin & Hollifield 1994 
&  2004)  proposes  that  there  is  increasing  similarity  among  the  industrialized,  labour- 
importing countries in terms of policies, effects and public reactions to immigration. Due to 
globalization, businesses and governments in OECD countries have been forced to deregulate 
and  liberalize  labour  and  capital  markets  in  order  to  compete  in  the  new  marketplace 
(Hollifield  2000).  Therefore,  the  argument  goes,  countries’  immigration  policies  are 
converging because of similar domestic pressures from skilled labour shortages. In the last 
years,  the  trend  among  OECD  countries  has  been  towards  HSI  liberalization.  Yet, 
convergence does not occur as a result of different domestic political-economic institutions 
and  coalitions.  Even  the  proponents  of  the  convergence  hypothesis  have  become  more 
cautious about categorizing similarities as “examples of true policy convergence” (Cornelius 
et al. 2004: 15).  
 
On the other hand, while the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) authors (such as Hall & Soskice 
2001)  stress  continued divergence  in  economic  systems  in  countries, this  literature  solely 
focuses on economic arguments and institutional complementarity. Under closer inspection, 
not only is there variance between the three groups, which the VoC claims, but noteworthy 
within-group differences exist as well in terms of the openness of HSI policies. In Mixed 
Economies, Spain is considered the most restrictive country in terms of HSI, while France and 
Italy can be found more in the middle of the Lowell (2005) ranking. Countries’ categorization 
has also changed over the years as few initially restrictive countries have become more open 
towards HSI (e.g. France). Some countries among the Coordinated Market Economies (e.g. 
the Netherlands, Switzerland) target high-skilled immigrants to greater extent than others (e.g. 
Belgium, Sweden). In the Liberal Market Economy group, Ireland has experienced several 
policy  reforms  over  the  past  years  that  have  shifted  the  country’s  classification  from 
restrictive to very HSI open. As a consequence, countries’ policies cannot be deducted from a 
simple division into three VoC groups.  
 
I provide a contrasting approach to the VoC literature because I consider political processes 
that result in different outcomes among countries. The existing diversity of HSI outcomes 
demonstrates different political configurations and institutional set-ups in electoral systems 
and  labour  market  organization.  In  addition,  actors  have  particular  HSI  preferences;  and 
political institutions provide power and representation to actors to a different degree. I argue 
that coalition-building between affected actors with varying HSI preferences, intermediated 
by labour market organization and electoral system, determines cross-national variation in 
HSI policy outcomes. In my approach, I present a political-economy explanation for different 
HSI policies in OECD countries, which is largely missing in the literature.  
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2.2 Assumptions 
I start from the basic assumption that rational actors have preferences they seek to achieve 
through  the  political  process.  Four  actors  with  particular  HSI  preferences  emerge  at  the 
individual  level:  native  high-skilled  workers,  native  low-skilled  workers,  high-skilled 
industries  and  low-skilled  industries.  Political-economic  organization  and  institutions 
governing their political participation determine the preferences and behaviour of these actors 
(Martin & Swank 2004). Preferences interact with institutions and lead to particular outcomes. 
“Preferences” are personal wants and desires of political actors. ”Institutions” are formal and 
informal rules. “Outcomes” refer here to HSI legislative policies (official HSI legislation). I 
consider HSI immigration control policies, i.e. the rules and procedures for the selection and 
admission of high-skilled immigrants (based on Hammar 1985). The focus lies on temporary
4 
primary legal HSI that is meant to fill labour shortages in mainly internationally competitive 
sectors that are essential for knowledge economies.  
 
Figure 1: HSI causal schema 
 
 
 
 
 
I  introduce  a  rational  one-dimensional  model  because  I  consider  economic  issues  more 
significant  than  cultural  explanations  in  differentiating  HSI  policies  (based  on  works  by 
Mayda 2004, Scheve & Slaughter 2001, Timmer & Williamson 1998)
5. The small number of 
high-  skilled  immigrants  is  less  likely  linked  with  a  negative  feeling  of  changed  cultural 
identity in the whole population as is the case of immigration in general (Money & Falstrom 
2006). Generally higher earnings and likely fluency in the receiving country’s language ease 
the integration of high-skilled immigrants who come to work in particular sectors with labour 
market shortages
6. Nevertheless, the national identity literature would argue that immigration 
policies can be explained through the impact of historical experiences, cultural idioms and 
social conflicts (Hollifield 1992, Money 1999). Some authors have put immigration into a 
two-dimensional plane, which treats both economic and cultural issues (see Brubaker 1992, 
Zolberg  1999).  This  literature  is  of  less  concern  to  my  theoretical  framework  because  it 
mostly applies to (low-skilled labour) immigration and cannot explain that various countries 
have adopted similar policies at the same time (Meyers 2000). 
 
Therefore, in agreement with Kessler (1999), I concentrate on rational economic interests of 
actors, while neglecting to a large extent cultural or sociological issues. I argue that HSI 
comes closer to a purely economic model than immigration in general because HSI is usually 
strongly associated with economic benefits and linked less with a negative impact on the 
population.  The  Productivity  Commission  report  states  that  “skilled  immigrants  are  less 
reliant on transfer payments, and are more likely to earn higher incomes and pay more in 
Preferences  Outcomes 
Labour Market 
Organisation 
and 
Electoral System 
Open or  
Restrictive 
HSI policies 
HS Labour 
LS Labour 
Capital 
 Institutions  
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taxes” (2006:113). It seems that, overall, implemented temporary high-skilled immigration 
programmes have sparked little public criticism overall (Freeman 2006).  
 
On the whole, HSI is considered positive for a country’s economic growth. The Productivity 
Commission of Australia report shows the likely effects over 20 years of the government 
increasing the current intake of skilled migrants by 50 percent. In the Commission's modelling, 
the economy would grow by 3.5 percent by 2024-2025 and average incomes would be $335 
higher (2006: 137). More generally, George Borjas assumes that the increase in skills through 
HSI “accelerates the rate of scientific discovery”, which can bring large benefits for particular 
groups of the population (2006:32). However, HSI creates distributional consequences for 
different  sectors  of  labour  and  capital  that  in  turn  establish  varying  preferences  for  HSI 
policy.
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I claim that we cannot deduct HSI policy outcomes across countries and political parties from 
a  simple  partisanship  examination,  which  states  that  the  Left  will  defend  the  interests  of 
labour and the Right will represent the preferences of capital (see Alt 1985, Hibbs 1977)
8. 
Following this framework, we would expect left parties to be for more restrictive HSI policies 
to protect native workers, whereas right parties will favour more open HSI in order to please 
their capital constituency. However, we do not observe such simple linkage between parties 
and HSI positions.  
 
For  example,  the  Social  Democrats  in  Germany  have  started  to  garner  electoral  support 
among  both  high-  and  low-skilled  workers  due  to  waning  membership  numbers  and  the 
resulting focus on new constituency groups (Norris 2004). The New Labour in the UK seeks 
to  combine  increased  competitiveness  of  the  economy  with  the  traditional  protection  of 
workers. With increasing globalization, the focus on the knowledge economy has become 
important  for  countries’  prosperity  (Driver  &  Martell  2002)  and  the  Left  also  tries  to 
accommodate the demands of businesses by filling labour market shortages with high-skilled 
immigrants.  
 
Therefore, this analysis departs from the traditional consideration of labour and capital and 
regards them as heterogeneous groups because lobbying efforts depend on the sector. The 
main question for this partisanship analysis is which parties have a core constituency among 
(high-skilled) labour and which ones among capital. Then parties’ position can be tested with 
these  hypotheses:  (1)  If  the  constituency  of  a  party  is  strong  among  native  high-skilled 
workers, then I expect this party to be against HSI; and (2) If the party’s constituency is made 
up to a large extent of capital, then I assume that this party will be more supportive of HSI. 
 
In the first case, if native high-skilled workers make up the party’s constituency to a large 
degree, then it will adopt a more restrictive HSI position to garner electoral support. Native 
high-skilled workers will regard high-skilled immigrants as competitors and hence take on 
restrictive policy preferences. In the second case, if a party’s constituency is made up to large 
extent of capital, then the party will seek to acknowledge the preferences in order to keep its 
support  with  a  more  open  HSI  position.  Nonetheless,  complications  in  the  prediction  of 
parties’  HSI  position  arise  if  one  party  considers  both  high-skilled  labour  and  capital  as 
important constituencies. In this case, the predicted HSI position becomes less determinable 
since the party will try to reconcile the different preferences of its constituencies in a single 
HSI position. 
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With a reshaping of the electorate, parties now increasingly represent both capital and labour 
groups that can often be native high-skilled workers. While the generally recognize the need 
for  HSI  for  country’s  economic  growth,  they  are  drawn  between  representing  two  main 
constituencies with varying HSI preferences: capital lobbying for more open policy and high-
skilled  workers  favouring  more  restrictive  HSI  policy.  As  a  result,  parties  differ  in  their 
position on the terms and conditions of immigration.  In the German example, the Christian 
Democrats were generally in favour of more open HSI policy, but they displayed a different 
position on the terms of the policy from the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Liberals 
who  were  highly  in  favour  of  liberalizing  HSI  policy.  In  majoritarian  countries,  the  HSI 
position  varies  less  between  political  parties  who  favour  an  open  HSI  policy.  Parties 
aggregate preferences from different constituencies and display similar positions to attract as 
many voters as possible. For instance, both the Labour and Conservative parties in the UK 
have comparable HSI positions: they agree that high-skilled immigrants are beneficial for 
UK’s  economy  and  society  and  the  government  should  hence  focus  on  facilitating  their 
recruitment.   
 
2.3 Preferences 
 
Following  the  above  assumptions,  I  introduce  a  high-skilled  versus  low-skilled  sectoral 
division. Table 1 displays predictions on the preferences of owners and workers in industries 
based  on  their  labour  sensitivity  to  (high-skilled  workers)  and  complementarity/ 
substitutability of high-skilled immigrants.  
 
Table 1: Sectoral model of HSI policy preferences of workers and owners 
 
HS- Immigrants  Complement (LS workers)  Substitute (HS workers) 
High (HS) labour sensitivity 
(HS sectors) 
Owners strongly  
pro-immigration,  
workers  
weakly/ moderately so 
 
Owners strongly  
pro-immigration,  
workers strongly opposed 
 
Low (HS) labour sensitivity 
(LS sectors) 
Both  owners  and  workers 
weakly/moderately  
pro-immigration 
Owners low salience,  
weak support;  
workers strongly opposed 
 
 
2.3.1   Native high-skilled (HS) labour 
 
I hypothesize that native high-skilled workers will oppose more open HSI policies due to 
labour  market  competition.  With  the  immigration  of  high-skilled  workers,  the  supply  of 
qualified workers increases, which decreases the wages in the sector (Borjas 1995 & 2003). 
Specifically, Borjas’ research has found that wages of US native high-skilled workers (i.e. 
college  graduates)  have  fallen  by  4.9  percent  with  the  entry  of  high-skilled  immigrants 
between 1980 and 2000 (2003: 1370). For PhD graduates in the US, the impact of high-
skilled immigrant influx has been quite substantial between 1993 and 2001 and wage drops 
have varied according to the sector, ranging from 3.6 percent for science and engineering 
doctorates to 10 percent for computer science and mechanical engineering (Borjas 2006). 
Native  high-skilled  workers  lose  because  they  have  to  accept  lower  wages  and/or  face 
unemployment  due  to  smaller  labour  mobility  opportunities  than  for  low-skilled  labour. 
Therefore, high-skilled labour has a political incentive to lobby for HSI restriction.    
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2.3.2   Native low-skilled (LS) labour  
 
I assume that low-skilled workers are weakly/moderately pro- HSI due to a complementarity 
effect.  They  can  benefit  from  HSI  because  of  greater  productivity  and  wages  through 
increased demand for labour services (Chiswick 2005). “Trades people, labourers, transport 
workers, and production workers could see wages increase slightly [around 1.2 percent], as 
new migrants add demand in areas such as housing construction” (Productivity Commission 
2006: 134). In the long-run, economic growth through innovation generated by high-skilled 
workers  could  make  low-skilled  workers  better  off  and  increase  their  standard  of  living 
(Crouch, Finegold & Sako 2004).  
 
2.3.3   High-skilled (HS) capital  
 
Owners or employers in high- skilled sectors (e.g. high-tech or engineering) will be strongly 
in favour of HSI in order to benefit from lower wages and sustain their ability to grow. They 
will  be  even  more  supportive  in  the  case  of  sectoral  labour  market  shortages  where 
outsourcing is not possible. HSI increases the supply of labour, which decreases the wages in 
the sector.  Businesses can produce more cheaply and become more competitive because they 
can offer products at lower prices. In addition, a larger pool of high- skilled workers permits 
businesses to save cost for training and skill acquisition and the process of hiring labour to 
respond to market conditions. As a result, high-skilled capital has a political incentive to 
lobby for HSI liberalization.  
 
2.3.4   Low-skilled (LS) capital 
 
Owners and employers in low-skilled sectors can indirectly benefit from an inflow of high-
skilled  immigrants.  They  can  take  advantage  of  raised  opportunities  for  sales  and  hence 
increase their output and profit. First, high-skilled immigrants are consumers and can buy 
products  from  low-skilled  industries  and  increase  their  profit.  Second,  they  can  help  to 
improve  the  production  process  and  decrease  production  costs  in  the  end  (Productivity 
Commission 2006: 120). I, therefore, will group high- and low-skilled capital together as 
‘capital’  for  the  purpose  of  a  simplified  framework.  Even  though  low-skilled  capital  will 
unlikely devote resources to lobby by itself for more open HSI policies, both capital sectors 
will more or less favour HSI liberalization, whereas the preferences among the labour group 
are more heterogeneous and thus have to be treated as separate groups. Following the works 
of other authors (such as Chiswick 2005), this analysis will thereafter only consider three 
factors: native high-skilled labour, native low-skilled labour and capital.  
 
2.4 Coalitions between actors 
 
I proceed by examining coalitions between actors for supporting a certain HSI policy. My 
research fits into the political economy literature, especially the analysis of coalitions between 
labour and capital for specific policies (see Gourevitch 1986, Gourevitch & Shinn 2005 and 
Rogowski 1989). In the area of labour migration, Leah Haus (2002) and Julie Watts (2002) 
have considered similar coalitions between unions and employers. The common assumption is 
that labour will unite against capital and oppose immigration. Then we would have an intra-
class coalition scenario, made up of different groups within a class. However, as a result of 
the sectoral division of labour and capital, we are unlikely to see a consistent position of 
labour pressing for restriction and capital lobbying for openness across countries. Instead,  
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unusual (i.e. cross-class) coalitions can form among different groups of capital and labour, 
which can also play out in the case of HSI. Table 2 portrays possible coalitions between 
different  sectors  of  labour  and  capital.    In  this  scenario,  there  are  six  possible  coalitions 
between the three actors: native high-skilled (HS) labour, native low-skilled (LS) labour and 
capital.  
 
Table 2: Political coalitions and HSI outcomes 
 
Coalitional line-up  Winner  Predicted HSI outcome 
Pair A:      
1) HS Labour + LS Labour vs. 
Capital 
HS Labour + LS labour  Restrictive 
 
2) HS labour + LS labour vs.  
Capital 
Capital  Open 
     
Pair B:      
1) HS labour + Capital vs.  
LS labour 
HS Labour + Capital  Restrictive 
2) HS Labour + Capital vs.  
LS Labour 
LS Labour  Open 
     
Pair C:      
1) LS Labour + Capital vs.  
HS Labour 
LS Labour + Capital  Open 
2) LS Labour + Capital vs.  
HS Labour 
HS Labour  Restrictive 
 
 
Pair A: HS Labour + LS Labour vs. Capital 
 
A1) High-skilled labour and low-skilled labour can form a coalition against capital for more 
restrictive HSI policies if they agree on a trade-off. For example, HSI restrictiveness could be 
offered in return for the protection of low-skilled labour against low-skilled immigration or 
for support of their efforts for higher wages. High-skilled labour is a smaller (and sector-
concentrated) group than low-skilled labour, thus it could organize more effectively and press 
for  its  desired  outcome,  especially  due  to  the  intensity  of  its  restrictive  preferences.  The 
bigger  low-skilled  group  will  only  be  weakly/moderately  supportive  and  while  HSI  can 
benefit low-skilled workers, the link is rather indirect and the impact is smaller than for high-
skilled  workers.    As  a  result,  low-skilled  workers  will  put  less  effort  and  resources  into 
convincing high-skilled workers otherwise and can follow the cues of the latter group.  
 
A2) If capital emerges as winner, then the HSI outcome will be more open policy. This group 
can highly benefit from high-skilled immigrants for the previously examined reasons and will 
lobby for liberalization. 
 
Pair B: HS Labour + Capital vs. LS Labour 
 
B1) High-skilled labour and capital can form a coalition if they can strike a bargain and 
decide on a trade-off. Native high- skilled workers will be against HSI due to labour market 
competition, high-skilled industries will be highly in favour of HSI. Accordingly, they both 
have opposite preferences. However, they can form a coalition if they compromise on some  
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terms and potentially get a win-win situation. For instance, high-skilled industries promise not 
to press for more open HSI if native high-skilled workers agree to accept pay cuts. It is likely 
that a coalition for liberalized policy takes place since native high-skilled workers cannot 
currently meet the demand in both the quantity and labour productivity. In addition, in many 
sectors and sub-sectors, outsourcing is not an option
9. If high-skilled industries guarantee 
same  wages  and  working  conditions  for  high-skilled  immigrants  and  do  not  threaten  the 
labour market position of native high-skilled workers, then a coalition between these two 
groups is possible. Nevertheless, the resulting policy can still be considered more restrictive 
than  in  the  case  of  overwhelming  HSI  support  from  only  high-skilled  industries.  The 
restrictive outcome will be visible in the terms of agreement and conditions attached to the 
HSI policy.  
 
B2) Low-skilled labour can emerge as winner, with more open HSI outcome. The group can 
benefit from high-skilled immigrants due to increased employment opportunities. In this case, 
capital wins as well
10.  
 
Pair C:  LS Labour + Capital vs. HS Labour 
 
C1) Low-skilled labour and capital can form a coalition and press for open HSI policies. Both 
capital  and  low-skilled  labour  can  benefit  from  high-skilled  immigrants  since  they  are 
complements to native high-skilled workers. They are then able to unite against the restrictive 
HSI efforts of high-skilled labour. The agreement in the coalition can also be reached more 
implicitly than explicitly. Low-skilled group does not have to exhibit strong verbal presence; 
silence in HSI matters can also be interpreted as agreement. 
 
C2) If high-skilled labour wins in the political contest, then the outcome for HSI policies will 
be more restrictive due to the labour market competition argument described in the previous 
section.  
 
In these three cases, two outcomes are possible (open or restrictive HSI policy)
11, depending 
on the strength of the coalition vis-à-vis the third actor. The threshold of support for each 
group  in  a  coalition  is  absolute  majority.  Either  the  coalition  wins  and  can  achieve  its 
preferred policy or the opponent (third actor) manages to succeed and press for its desired 
policy. The strongest coalition will prevail. Strength comes from political resources, such as 
votes, lobbying ability or direct action. Labour groups can signify important voters for parties 
or directly influence them through unions, whereas the lobbying ability of high-skilled capital 
can be very strong due to its financial contribution to electoral campaigns. Which coalitions 
form and which ones win in the political arena depends on the interaction of preferences and 
institutions  (based  on  Gourevitch  &  Shinn  2005).  Institutions  can  constrain  the  range  of 
possibilities for HSI outcomes.  
 
HSI  changes  occur  within  a  country  when  preferences  or  institutions  alter.  If  the  policy 
preferences of one or more of the groups of actors alter enough to disrupt the coalitional 
balance, a new alignment can take place. Or the political institutions can alter, though this is 
far less common than a modification in preferences. A shift in HSI preferences can occur 
when economic conditions change, such as the appearance of labour market shortages, the 
increased influx of high-skilled immigrants, the raise in unemployment rates, the decrease of 
wages  for  particular  sectors,  among  others.  As  preferences  vary,  each  group  (and  each 
potential coalition) faces trade-offs in moving from one policy position to another. I examine 
how partisan preferences are manifested in the realm of HSI policy and how they become  
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reduced or strengthened by the institutions. More specifically, I consider the impact of labour 
market organization and electoral system.  
 
2.5 Institutional interactions 
 
The idea that institutions matter is a widely used conclusion in the literature (see, for example, 
North 1990 or Przeworski 2003). Institutions are the set of rules that determine the processes 
of rule-making and enforcement, and act as the mechanisms that aggregate preferences and 
link  politicians  to  constituencies.  Many  authors  have  adapted  the  idea  of  institutional 
constraints to different policy areas (see Calmfors & Driffill 1988, Iversen & Soskice 2006 
and Wallerstein 1999). The question remains, how much institutions matter for explaining 
HSI  policy  outcomes.  This  analysis  only  concentrates  on  labour  market  organization  and 
electoral system because they share one common feature: the representation of specific actors 
and the resulting potential for coalition building between groups. Various degrees of union or 
employer centralization/ coordination lead to different representation of high-skilled workers 
and industries and determine the potential for coalitions. Conversely, electoral system and the 
role of political parties have a varying propensity to represent the interests of different groups 
and induce different circumstances for forming coalitions. Institutions affect policy winners in 
the political contest. 
 
 
2.5.1 Labour Market Organization 
 
Varying HSI preferences of high- and low-skilled labour and capital sectors can be intensified 
through their representation by unions and employers’ associations, respectively. Hence, the 
organization of the labour market becomes an important indicator for policy outcomes. The 
literature  has  analyzed  extensively  the  impact  of  individual  indicators  of  unions  and 
employers’  associations  on  policies  (see  Iversen  1999,  Rueda  &  Pontusson  2000  and 
Wallerstein, Golden & Lange 1997). The following contribution on HSI is pertinent because 
labour market institutions determine the extent to which coalitions matter for explaining HSI 
outcomes.  I  consider  union  density  and  the  centralization/  coordination  of  unions  and 
employers, as they are the most important factors for HSI policy outcomes.  
 
First, it is significant to assess the share of high-skilled labour represented by unions, i.e. 
union density among high-skilled workers (thereafter HS union density). Density is defined as 
“union members who work as employees divided by the total number of wage and salary 
earners” (Wallerstein 1999: 659). If general union density is high, then the likelihood of high-
skilled workers being union members also increases. HS union density is especially high in 
Scandinavia  (up  to  80  percent)
12 ,  where  multiple  confederations  are  divided  along 
occupational  lines,  with  separate  peak  associations  for  blue-collar  workers,  white-collar 
workers and workers with university degrees. High HS union density means that the union 
movement  among  high-skilled  workers  is  strong  (workers  are  members  of  skilled  and 
professional unions) and carries considerable power to influence policy-making. Hence, high-
skilled workers in particularly affected sectors gain representation in unions. Yet, in other 
countries, low-skilled workers constitute the main union members and thus display other HSI 
preferences (e.g. Spain). In this case, low-skilled workers can be positively affected by HSI 
and unions will adopt more open positions. 
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Figure 2: Union density in OECD countries (2003) 
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Source: Visser 2006: 45. 
 
Overall, peak confederations of unions tend to behave as encompassing organizations (Olson 
1982). Encompassingness is the “degree to which a peak federation or union, encompasses a 
diversity of interests and constituencies. It is the extent to which unions encompass the work 
force, measured by the percentage of workers who are union members and the percentage 
who are covered by collective bargaining agreements” (Wallerstein, Golden & Lange 1997: 
381).  According  to  Mancur  Olson  (1974),  an  organization  representing  all  workers  (or 
businesses in a sector) will be less restrictive because it has “some incentive to make the 
society in which they operate more prosperous” and take into consideration the (long-term) 
interests of broad societal groups (Olson 1982: 74). Based on this logic, associations should 
display more open positions because HSI can lead to more innovation, economic growth and 
progress, and benefit the whole society. Since the organization is so encompassing, it cannot 
neglect the common good because it can otherwise hurt the largest group: HSI can benefit 
low-skilled labour due to increased employment opportunities.  
 
However, Olson’s assumption of the solidaristic behaviour of organizations does not hold for 
highly  unionized  countries  where  unions  include  high-skilled  workers  to  a  greater  extent 
(such as Scandinavia). In this case, particular unions adopt more restrictive HSI positions 
since they cannot  easily  neglect  the  restrictive  preferences  of  their  high-skilled members. 
Therefore,  I  claim  that  high  union  density  (i.e.  powerful  high-skilled  members)  and  high 
centralization/ coordination (i.e. greater decision-making power vis-à-vis employers) lead to 
more restrictive HSI policies. If unions represent high-skilled workers to a large extent, then 
they will support more restrictive HSI policies in order to protect the wages and employment 
conditions  of  their  members.  Union  opposition  against  HSI  has  taken  place  in  several 
countries.  
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On the other hand, if high-skilled workers are covered by unions to a smaller extent, then 
these will less likely adopt a restrictive position. The main union confederation in Germany, 
DGB, has to cater to a heterogeneous group of members, including workers with different 
skill levels. The position has been more open towards HSI because the DGB has been trying 
not  to  hurt  the  large  number  of  (low-skilled)  members  who  can  profit  from  high-skilled 
immigrants. It considers the common good for all workers, exhibited by the introduction of 
the Green Card for IT specialists in 2000. The DGB can follow cues from the largest union in 
the confederation (IG Metall), but it only covered high-skilled IT workers to a small degree 
and so the outcome was a liberalized policy towards IT immigrants. 
 
Second, the extent of associations’ power in HSI policy-making depends on the labour market 
organization  across  countries,  especially  the  centralization/  coordination  of  unions  and 
employers.  Both  organized  workers  and  employers  have  specific  HSI  preferences  and 
demonstrate different centralization levels across OECD countries. Kenworthy (2003) and 
Swank & Martin (2004) classify union and employers’ centralization as the score of presence 
of national union and employers’ federation and the peak federation’s powers over members 
(i.e. appointment power, veto power of collective bargains and lockouts, own conflict funds). 
I treat centralization/ coordination as one variable since the outcome of high centralization or 
high coordination levels is often similar. Where employers and unions are highly centralized/ 
coordinated, I expect different outcomes for policies than in decentralized countries, in which 
they do not have much formal and coordinated input and need to turn to other means to lobby 
the government for their preferred position. As displayed in Figure 2, some countries have 
high union and employers’ centralization (e.g. Scandinavian countries), whereas others are 
low on both dimensions (e.g. France and the US). Nonetheless, no national employers’ peak 
associations exist in Canada and in the US (Ebbinghaus & Visser 2000).  
 
Figure 3: Centralization of unions and employers’ associations (1980-1998) 
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The organization of both labour and employers is important for the HSI analysis. Employer 
centralization/  coordination  goes  hand  in  hand  with  same  union  measures.  The  most  
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restrictive  HSI  policies  will  likely  take  place  in  countries  with  high  union  and  employer 
centralization/ coordination. This result can be seen in Scandinavian countries, where skilled/ 
professional  unions  representing  high-skilled  workers  were  against  more  liberalized  HSI 
policies. As unions have been very powerful and employers could not pass any policy without 
their consent (both are included in negotiations and bargaining with the government), the 
outcome turned out to be HSI restrictive because unions used to be opposed to (high-skilled) 
labour  immigration  and  acted  against  employers.  Only  recently  have  some  Scandinavian 
countries liberalized their HSI policy to a certain extent. More specifically, this change was 
possible due to a shift from the previous coalition between high- and low skilled labour to a 
coalition between high-skilled labour and capital. The coalition partners negotiated different 
trade-offs for reaching a common position. High-skilled labour agreed to liberalize HSI, but 
bargained with capital for attaching restrictive conditions to the employment conditions and 
wages of immigrants.  
 
There could be different reasons (or a combination of them) for the previously described 
change: (1) Unions have become weaker, i.e. union density and centralization levels have 
decreased  in  recent  years  in  some  countries.  As  a  result,  they  are  not  in  such  a  strong 
bargaining position against employers (and other peak confederations) as they used to be. (2) 
Unions have realized that the domestic economy was suffering because it cannot produce 
native workers in the numbers and with educational levels desired in such a short period of 
time, thus labour shortage would have a negative impact on the country. Unions have seen 
they are harming their members (especially low-skilled workers) and the overall economy. (3) 
International trade openness has increased, which is responsible for heightened international 
competitiveness and pressure for increased productivity. Countries have to respond to these 
pressures to larger extent than some years ago. 
 
In Mediterranean countries, both union and employer centralization/ coordination are low. 
Unions are generally weak and are not included in policy-making to a large degree. It is hard 
for associations to provide centralized resistance, especially since they represent mainly low-
skilled workers and compete among themselves for members. For example, French unions 
criticized the new 2006 legislation which allowed a higher number of high-skilled workers 
into the country, but did not grant them many rights, such as permanent settlement (Viprey 
2006). Even if sectoral associations argued for more open HSI policies, they did not have the 
necessary  political  and  financial  resources  to  change  the  extent  of  state  intervention  into 
policy-making. In countries with weak union movements, the organization of both workers 
and employers will be important for HSI policy outcomes. In countries with no employers’ 
associations,  powerful  interests  groups  (such  as  large  firms)  with  shared  interests  for 
particular  policy  proposals  usually  build  temporary  coalitions  in  order  to  combine  their 
political and financial resources and lobby relevant policy-makers (Hula 1999).  
 
In countries with low unionization, the restrictive preferences of the high-skilled group are not 
discarded. High-skilled workers can gain representation of their preferences in professional 
associations, i.e. “interest groups that can exercise economic and political power” (Freidson 
1986: 225). These exist for professions such as engineers, IT specialists, scientists, doctors, 
lawyers or architects, and can act in a similar way as labour unions for the protection of their 
members. Professional unions/ associations also act as occupational cartels for the protection 
of their high-skilled members from competition by others (Freidson 1986). They display a 
strong credential system that often does not allow outsiders (such as immigrants) to use their 
previous education and training. This means that many high-skilled immigrants start in low- 
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skill jobs in the short-run and can only move up to a position corresponding to their high-skill 
level in the long-run, as is the case in Scandinavian countries. 
 
In highly centralized/ coordinated countries, unions are involved in policy-making and have 
the  necessary  power  to  lobby  for  their  interests.  In  decentralized  countries,  unions  and 
professional associations have to organize themselves in order to lobby political parties in 
government  if  they  wish  to  achieve  their  goals.  For  example,  high-skilled  workers  are 
represented through specific unions in Scandinavian countries, while professional associations 
lobby  for  the  interests  of  their  members  in  other  countries,  such  as  the  UK  or  the  US. 
However, in the end, the government yielded to the lobbying of employers for more open HSI 
policies. In the US, professional associations lobbied against H-1B visa increases, but they 
were less organized and powerful than employers and hence did not achieve their desired HSI 
restrictions. 
 
2.5.2 Electoral System 
 
Unions and employers’ associations do not cover the interests of workers and industries to the 
same extent across countries. However, these groups can signify important constituencies for 
political parties, even though their degree of representation differs depending on the electoral 
system.  Therefore,  I  also  take  into  account  institutional  constraints  through  the  electoral 
system as part of the interaction between HSI preferences and HSI outcomes. This section 
applies the literature on electoral systems to the area of HSI and draws on the works by Bawn 
&  Rosenbluth  2003,  Lijphart  1994  and  Norris  2004.  The  electoral  system  is  “the  set  of 
methods for translating the citizen’s votes into representatives’ seats” (Lijphart 1994: 1). I 
argue that the electoral system affects the party composition of governments and as a result, 
HSI policies. HSI policy outcomes broadly indicate that (1) majoritarian systems have more 
open  policies,  and  (2)  proportional  representation  (PR)  systems  display  more  restrictive 
policies (even if there is variation in the extent of openness inside the groups). It matters for 
open  or  restrictive  HSI  policy  whether  a  political  party  with  a  significant  high-skilled 
constituency  has  representation  in  single-party  or  coalition  government.  Table  3  divides 
countries into two main categories: majoritarian and PR electoral systems.  
 
Table 3: Distinction between electoral systems  
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Figure  4  indicates  the  degree  of  proportionality  in  the  electoral  system.  Proportionality 
“summarizes the degree to which each party’s share of seats corresponds to its share of votes”  
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(Norris 2004: 88). In general, majoritarian countries (i.e. Australia, Canada and the UK) are 
less proportional than PR systems (i.e. Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden).  
 
Figure 4: Proportionality of electoral system 
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The higher the degree of proportionality, the higher should be the correspondence of votes to 
seats. Therefore, the representation of preferences of particular actors should be greater in 
proportional countries than in majoritarian countries. The type of electoral system matters for 
the representation of high-skilled groups in the political system and has an impact for the 
further analysis on HSI policy outcomes. High-skilled workers can constitute an important 
constituency for political parties since they tend to earn higher incomes, to contribute more in 
taxes and to use less welfare benefits than low-skilled workers. Nonetheless, even if the recent 
OECD average of tertiary educated citizens is 19 percent (OECD 2006), the number of native 
workers affected by HSI is likely to be smaller due to the narrowed analysis to particular 
competitive sectors and higher degrees.  
 
The composition of governments and parties’ core constituencies determines the outcome of 
HSI policies. As stated under the assumptions in earlier section, I expect different groups of 
labour or capital to signify core voters for political parties. The final HSI outcome will then 
depend on the type of electoral system. This is important for HSI policies for two reasons: (1) 
the degree of constituency representation is reflected in parties’ HSI position and (2) the 
extent of translation of HSI preferences into policies is based on the type of government. This 
analysis proceeds with the usual assumption in the literature that majoritarian systems tend to 
go together with two-party systems and single-party majority governments; and PR systems 
are  usually  linked  with  multi-party  systems  and  coalition  governments  (see  Cox  1990, 
Duverger  1954  and  Riker  1984).  Nevertheless,  some  PR  countries  have  had  single-party 
governments (e.g. Austria and Sweden) and some majoritarian countries have experienced 
coalition governments, such as Australia and Ireland (Iversen & Soskice 2006).  
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Single-party governments in majoritarian systems tend to present themselves as encompassing 
of  society’s  interests  (Bawn  &  Rosenbluth  2003).  Coalitions  are  usually  formed  before 
elections since groups have an incentive to join forces to increase their influence: majoritarian 
systems  represent  coalitions  within  parties.  The  main  parties  need  to  win  the  support  of 
several groups with various interests since they seek an absolute majority of votes. As a result, 
the government portrays HSI as beneficial for the society as a whole because high-skilled 
immigrants are associated with economic growth, innovation and progress for the receiving 
country. If parties are trying to aggregate preferences from many groups, then the ability for 
the representation of a specific group is relatively low. They are especially concerned about 
the  welfare  of  the  society  as  a  whole  and  point  to  the  benefits  of  HSI,  which  election 
manifestos of main parties in majoritarian countries demonstrate. As a result, the outcome is 
likely to be more open towards HSI. 
 
On the other hand, PR systems have low thresholds and large district magnitudes. Parties can 
be elected to parliament by targeting a smaller part of the population and stressing differences 
in society (Norris 2004).  They present varying preferences and policy positions at the time of 
election, but groups engage in building coalitions after elections in coalition governments 
(Gourevitch & Shinn 2005). Parties are not very encompassing and tend to neglect national 
interest as a whole. Political parties in PR systems seem to present differing HSI positions at 
the time of election (e.g. Germany and Sweden). Whereas more open HSI can benefit society 
as a whole, especially native high-skilled workers lose due to increased competition. After 
elections, parties with a core constituency among high-skilled labour will be able to support 
their interests and achieve more restrictive HSI policies in a coalition government, where 
finding a policy compromise is crucial. For example, Germany’s right parties (CDU/ CSU) 
pressed  for more  restrictive  policies  in  order to  protect  native  workers,  one  of  their  core 
constituencies.
13 As parties represent different interests (at least on some terms and conditions 
of HSI), the final policy will be more restrictive towards HSI. 
 
Proportionality also matters for the degree of policy change. Majoritarian systems exhibit 
more radical policy changes than PR systems (when considering single versus multi-party 
governments).  They  amplify  small  shifts  of  preference  into  bigger  swings  of  policy 
(Gourevitch & Shinn 2005). When we look at the UK example, a small shift in preferences of 
high-skilled industries (e.g. IT) for more liberalization resulted in a large HSI policy change. 
A  single-party  government  can  implement  its  policies  and  does  not  need  to  consult  or 
compromise with other parliamentary parties or societal groups. In a coalition government, at 
least two parties have to decide on a policy and hence have to find a compromise. Parties 
representing business interests to a higher extent and parties standing behind the preferences 
of high-skilled workers will have opposing interests in the terms and conditions of HSI policy. 
Nonetheless,  they  will  have  to  come  up  with  a  final  policy,  which  is  likely  to  be  more 
restrictive.  
 
HSI policies have changed in several countries over time. Some countries have experienced 
more ‘drastic’ changes than others. For example, among the majoritarian systems, Ireland and 
the  UK  have  quickly  reformed  their  immigration  policies  and  introduced  more  open 
conditions for admitting high-skilled immigrants. On the contrary, other countries with PR 
systems have only gradually reformed their policies, which still tend to be more restrictive 
than  those  of  the  previously  mentioned  group.  Examples  include  Austria,  Denmark  and 
Germany.  Labour  market  shortages  in  certain  sectors  have  prompted  political  parties  and 
governments to act. Especially high-skilled capital has demanded more open HSI policies in 
order to raise economic growth, innovation and competitiveness for the benefit of the whole  
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society. As a consequence, political parties representing high-skilled capital have proposed to 
reform HSI policies to take care of the preferences of their constituencies. Electoral system as 
an institution is less likely to change than preferences, but it can modify or sustain the degree 
of change in actor’s preferences and the final policy implementation. In addition, the type of 
electoral system is linked with the form of government. Over-time shifts in HSI policies are 
the result of: (1) in majoritarian systems, changing political parties in power representing 
various groups and (2) in PR systems, shifting coalition governments consisting of different 
parties with specific HSI preferences. 
 
3. Preliminary Evidence 
 
Preliminary findings indicate that not all portrayed scenarios (in Section 2.4) are empirically 
present. Especially winners of coalitions between high- and low-skilled labour (A1), high-
skilled labour and capital (B1), low-skilled labour and capital (C1), as well as capital (A2) 
have  appeared.  For  example,  Sweden,  Denmark,  the  United  Kingdom/  Germany  and  the 
United States, respectively, illustrate the previously mentioned coalitions and different HSI 
outcomes. In addition, coalitions have shifted in some countries.  
 
Table 4: Typology of cases and variables 
 
Union density  PR +  high  
centralization/ coordination 
Majoritarian + low centralization/ 
coordination 
High (>70%) 
 
Sweden 
Denmark 
 
Medium - low  
(20- 40%) 
Germany  UK 
Low (<20%) 
 
  USA 
 
 
A1) HS Labour + LS Labour: Sweden 
Sweden does not have a specific policy towards HSI, yet. The provisions for high-skilled 
immigrants are included in its (labour) immigration law. Specific unions have played a strong 
role in opposing more open HSI in order to protect its (high-skilled) members. Nevertheless, 
we expect a change to occur towards greater liberalization as the new government after the 
2006  elections  consists  of  a  coalition  between  Conservatives,  Centre  Party,  Christian 
Democrats  and  Greens.  A  committee  has  put  forward  a  proposal  for  more  open  labour 
immigration policy. However, unions would retain the right to check that immigrants were 
given same wages, insurance protection and other terms of employment and thus would not 
undercut native workers (Bucken-Knapp 2007, EMN 2006). As a result, a coalition between 
high-skilled labour and capital could take place since they are both included in policy-making 
(similar to Denmark). 
 
A2) Capital: United States 
Unions  and  employer  associations  have  little  power,  but  capital  can  profit  from  HSI. 
Therefore,  a  change in HSI  policy has  taken  place  when powerful  IT  companies  lobbied 
political parties for more open HSI policies and offered financial contributions in return. The 
IT business lobby was a new actor during the 1990s and was successful in getting the 65,000 
cap on H-1B visas raised first 77 percent in 1999 and then an additional 69 percent in 2000 
(Lowell 2001). On the other hand, professional and union associations in the US representing 
high-skilled  workers  (e.g.  Institute  of  Electrical  and  Electronics  Engineers,  Washington  
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Alliance of Technology Workers and American Engineering Association) have been at the 
forefront of opposing H-1B increases. However, in this decentralized system, employers have 
been better organized and more powerful than unions and professional associations and won 
their quest for H-1B increases in the end (Freeman & Hill 2006).  
 
B1) HS Labour + Capital: Denmark 
In Denmark, some high-skilled unions have become willing to liberalize HSI policy in order 
to  secure  future  welfare  and  economic  development.  These  include  Danish  Society  of 
Engineers, IDA, in cooperation with The Industry Trade Union for skilled workers, Dansk 
Metal. Most unions express a lot of concern about labour immigration in their specific field. 
For example, PROSA, the Association of Computer Professionals, has linked the question of 
immigration  to  the  enlargement  of  the  EU  in  two  high  profile  statements:  (1)  foreign 
specialists should not dump wages and (2) Danish unemployed IT-specialists must be given 
preferential treatment over foreign specialists (Stenum 2005: 16). 
 
In January 2005, The Danish Society for Engineers, together with the National Employers 
Organization  DA  and  DI,  the  Trade  Union  Danish  Metal  and  the  Ministry  of  Integration 
arranged  a  conference  titled:  ‘Denmark  needs  the  clever  ones  from  the  whole  world.’ 
Presenters included the Minister of Integration, representatives from supportive organizations 
and CEOs from businesses (such as Microsoft) who all spoke about the need for high-skilled 
labour migrants in the future. Overall, the event was a rare opportunity to discuss labour 
immigration (Stenum 2005). 
 
C1a) LS Labour + Capital: United Kingdom  
The UK seems to have experienced shifts in coalitions. From the initial lobbying of capital for 
more open policies due to labour market shortages, the debate has now extended to include 
unions as well. For the first time in 2005, the New Labour government has consulted the trade 
union (TUC) and the employers’ association (CBI) on migration policies who both agreed on 
the need to manage migration. The country has a (loose) social partnership between unions, 
employers and the government, even if unions are now rather weak. The union confederation 
represents  mainly  low-skilled  workers  (62  unions  in  total)  and  is  interested  in  providing 
information on employment rights, representation and membership. On the other hand, the 
employers are keen on recruiting migrants in order to fill labour market shortages in particular 
sectors of the economy (Ensor & Shah 2005, Layton-Henry 2004). The outcome has been an 
open HSI policy. 
 
C1b) LS Labour + Capital: Germany 
A debate emerged in 2001 on extending the scheme to other sectors after the introduction of 
the Green Card for IT workers. Unions feared that high-skilled immigrants could lead to 
lower pay, undermine the wage standard and, if the scheme was extended to other branches 
where unions were better represented than in the IT sector, weaken collective agreements. The 
DGB  cooperated  with  employers  and  found  a  common  ground  for  reformed  immigration 
policy in the end (Behrens 2001). In Germany, the coalition between (low-skilled) labour and 
capital for more liberal HSI did not help them to achieve a major HSI policy reform (new 
legislation came into force in 2005) due to the opposition of the (Christian-Democratic) party 
that argued for the protection of native high-skilled workers. Therefore, a change in HSI 
policy was possible when political parties in the coalition government (and both chambers) 
agreed on a compromise. In the end, Germany adopted a more restrictive HSI policy (Cyrus 
& Vogel 2005, Hess & Sauer 2006). 
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4. Conclusion  
 
This paper has set up a theoretical framework for analyzing differences in OECD countries’ 
HSI policies over time. It has offered a contribution to the political economy literature in 
general and more specifically, to the immigration literature. High-skilled labour immigration 
remains largely unexplored in political science. This framework seeks to provide a starting 
point  for a fruitful  research  path that  analyzes HSI  through  a  political-economy  lens.  By 
portraying a coalitional argument, I have offered a more enriching explanation for differences 
between  countries’  HSI  policies  than  the  existing  literature  on  partisanship  and  structural 
economic  factors  provides.  In  particular,  this  paper  challenges  the  common  partisanship 
literature by offering a disaggregation of labour and capital into high-and low-skilled sectors. 
I expect to demonstrate diversity in HSI outcomes, rather than convergence toward a single 
policy for the following reasons: (1) the preferences of native high-skilled labour, native low-
skilled labour and capital differ and shift over time, (2) six different political coalitions are 
possible and (3) institutions intermediate between preferences and outcomes.  
 
The  paper  raises  some  important  points.  With  increasing  labour  market  shortages,  the 
international competition for the ‘best and brightest’ will continue to be fierce (Mahroum 
2001). Yet, some coalitions between actors and political-economic institutions impede further 
HSI liberalization in different countries. This raises the question whether these countries will 
fall  behind in  the  global  economic  competition.  On  the  other  hand, will  political  parties/ 
government neglect the interests of native (high-skilled) labour as they increasingly succumb 
to  the  pressure  of  capital?  Since  labour  market  shortages  threaten  economic  growth  and 
progress of countries, respective governments will have to respond to the demands for more 
open HSI. They will also have to react to the preferences of high-skilled workers for more 
restrictive policies. The numbers for HSI are already significant in some countries and are 
likely  to  increase  in  the  future  in  others
14.  This  can  heighten  tensions  within  countries 
between labour and capital over the desired HSI policy. It will be up to political parties in 
government to reconcile these tensions. In addition, labour market institutions could play a 
larger role in the representation of affected groups. If an increasing number of high-skilled 
workers organize in professional unions/ associations, they can become more powerful actors 
in lobbying the government. For example, the American Medical Association is a significant 
collective actor in the US.  
 
Overall, HSI is a significant policy area since international competition for the ‘best and 
brightest’ is expected to increase and thus to remain on government’s agenda due to limited 
alternatives for HSI in the short-run (Chiswick & Hatton 2003). Therefore, the processes and 
the support of different groups need to be better understood by policy-makers, political parties 
and voters. This paper has offered a first step in this direction by providing some preliminary 
evidence, but more detailed research will have to be undertaken in the future. Other types of 
countries would also provide valuable test cases, such as PR countries with low centralization/ 
coordination and low union density (e.g. Spain). Besides case studies, a quantitative analysis 
testing the propositions could also be undertaken. This paper has focused on national HSI 
policies,  but  future  research  could  analyze  attempts  at  other  levels  of  governance.  For 
example, the EU has proposed a Green Card for high-skilled immigrants. Due to the discussed 
differences  in  coalitions  and  institutional  factors,  an  agreement  on  a  single  EU  policy  is 
questionable. In addition, advances on policies have also been made at the international level, 
with  limited  success  to  date.  The  analysis  emphasizes  some  of  the  opportunities  and 
challenges that HSI presents for advanced industrial countries and has offered suggestions for 
a debate.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Among  the  OECD  countries,  I  focus  on  the  ‘usual  suspects’:  Australia  (ASL),  Austria 
(AUT),  Belgium  (BEL),  Canada  (CAN),  Denmark  (DEN),  Finland  (FIN),  France  (FRA), 
Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), the Netherlands (NEL), New Zealand (NZL), 
Norway  (NOR),  Portugal  (POR),  Spain  (SPA),  Sweden  (SWE),  Switzerland  (SWI),  the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). 
 
2 In the case of the European Union (EU), most member countries experience labour market 
shortages. Hence, HSI policies are increasingly designed to target ‘third-country nationals’, 
i.e. immigrants from outside the EU.  
 
3 These  can  be  classified  under  ‘Human  Resources  in  Science  and  Technology’  (HRST), 
which extends to everyone who has successfully completed post-secondary education (or is 
working in an associated S&T occupation); at its narrowest it covers only those with at least 
university-level qualifications in natural sciences or engineering (or working in an associated 
S&T  occupation)    (OECD  1995:8).  For  example,  these  sectors  include  information 
technology  (IT),  mathematical  sciences  and  engineering,  life  and  physical  sciences,  and 
medical sciences.  
 
4 I concentrate on temporary HSI policies designed for filling labour market shortages in 
different sectors across OECD countries. Temporary immigration can signify between three 
months and five years (Smith & Favell 2006: 15). Nevertheless, immigration can shift from 
temporary to permanent after several years.  
 
5 For example, Timmer and Williamson (1998) conclude that [US] immigration policy was 
consistently influenced by neither conventional macro-economic conditions nor xenophobic 
or  racist  feelings  in  the  receiving  country.  Instead,  income  distribution  was  particularly 
important in some countries who were trying to protect the wages and the skill premium of 
native workers. 
 
6 “On the surface, highly skilled foreign professional and business people present much less 
of  a  problem  than  manual  labourers…  Immigrant  scientists,  engineers  and  physicians 
reinforce the nation’s supply of scarce talent and mix easily with the domestic population by 
becoming dispersed throughout the country. Finally, the majority of these immigrants come 
legally; hence, the problems associated with the unauthorized do not materialize” (Portes & 
Rumbaut 1996: 293). Thanks to Timothy Hatton for this reference. 
   
7 Even though no direct evidence or index exist that measure the preferences for HSI policies 
of high- and low-skilled sectors of labour and capital, I work those out deductively by basing 
them on the distributional consequences for these groups.  In addition, I assume that the 
distributional preferences do not vary across countries. 
 
8 Broadly speaking, left parties are Social Democratic/ Socialist/ Labour and right ones are 
Conservative/ Christian Democratic parties, but it would be better to analyze partisanship on a 
left-right continuum.  
 
9 For  example,  IT  sub-sectors  prone  to  outsourcing  are:  application  maintenance,  custom 
application development and system integration. On the other hand, IT consulting, traditional 
IT outsourcing and sales and marketing have lower outsourcing potential and constitute about 
50% of all sector employment, thus the overall IT outsourcing potential is unlikely to increase  
  21 
                                                                                                                                                          
(Farrell  et  al  2005:  147).  In  addition,  company-specific  barriers  for  outsourcings  include 
unsuited processes, manager’s attitude or insufficient scale (Farrell et al. 2005: 25). 
 
10 Thanks to Adam Luedtke for this point (among others). 
 
11 ‘Restrictive’ means any limitation of HSI on any or combination of these dimensions:  1) 
mechanisms, 2) selection and 3) rights. ‘Open’ is defined as the opposite (see Ruhs 2006 for 
more detailed explanation). 
 
12 High HS union density is assumed for Scandinavia if we combine the union rates of skilled 
and professional unions (ranging between 24% and 50%), as compared to rates between 50% 
and 66% among the main (low-skilled) confederations.  
 
13 Even though the CDU/ CSU were not part of the coalition government at that time, they 
were nonetheless important for voting on HSI policy because of their majority in the upper 
house. Germany’s bicameralism further complicates the issue.  
 
15 In 2001, HSI expressed as a percentage of the total high-skilled workforce was particularly 
significant  (over  20%)  in  Australia,  Luxembourg,  Switzerland,  Canada  and  New  Zealand 
(Dumont & Lemaitre 2005:13).  
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